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Abstract 
Policy Challenges to China’s Shale Gas Industry 
William Travis Clayton, MGPS; MA 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2016 
Supervisor:  Joshua Busby 
As a result of China’s significant position in the petroleum market, contributions to 
greenhouse gas emissions, and domestic pollution, Chinese policy makers and industry 
leaders are increasingly highlighting China’s vast reserves of shale gas. Although there is 
growing production of shale gas in China’s Sichuan Basin, China’s state targets for shale 
gas development are still unmet. Thus, this work analyzes China’s shale gas policy, which 
is implemented through tools such as the petroleum sharing agreement, tax regimes, 
pipeline access, pricing system, regulatory structures, and international programs. Data in 
this paper is derived from published reports by industry experts. In addition, I carried out 
10 expert interviews for this project, with interviews in Houston and by telephone. This 
paper evaluates specific qualities that attract shale gas investment and reinforce a 
mutualistic relationship between petroleum companies and the government, and judges the 
qualities that harm this relationship and are hindering shale gas development. For example, 
China’s use of the sliding scale royalty, support for joint ventures, and research and 
development programs contribute to shale gas development. However, possible hindrances 
 v 
to China’s shale gas revolution include the production sharing agreement structure, the 
monopolization of conventional reserves by China’s national oil companies, the lack of 
competitive pipeline access, the unclear and excessive overlap of regulatory agencies, and 
several environmental concerns related to hydraulic fracturing. As a result, China’s shale 
gas revolution will likely be led by its National Oil Companies for the near future. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The People’s Republic of China is among the world’s largest oil and gas producers, 
ranking fourth in global crude oil production and sixth in natural gas output.1 China’s 
national oil companies (NOCs) –China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) and its 
publicly listed arm, Petrochina; Sinopec; China National Offshore Oil Corporation 
(CNOOC); and to a lesser extent Shaanxi Yanchang Petroleum – dominate China’s 
petroleum production, transportation, and marketing.2 Smaller firms such as Sinochem, 
Citic China, and several provincial companies are also active in China’s petroleum industry 
but are excluded from the upstream. 
As the world’s most populous country and a fast-growing economy, China’s 
consumption of petroleum products is rising at a rate faster than its production, resulting in 
dependency on foreign supplies. Because a majority of China’s crude oil and liquefied 
natural gas imports pass through the narrow Strait of Malacca, China’s petroleum supplies 
are exposed to geopolitical risk.3 This risk not only exposes the NOCs’ supply chains but 
also threatens China’s promised economic growth and social stability. Additionally, 
China’s recent pollution epidemic and contributions to global warming are piquing the 
leadership’s and industry’s interests in the country’s vast, underdeveloped shale gas 
1 International Energy Agency, “Key World Energy Statistics” International Energy Agency. 2014. 
2 Feng, Hongli. “2015 nian zhongguo yeyanqi kaifa zuixin jinzhan baogao 年中国页岩气开发最新进展报告 
[2015 Report on New Progress in China’s Shale Gas Development].” CNENERGY. May 8, 2015. 
http://www.cnenergy.org/yq/fcg/201505/t20150508_37088.html; Ding, Chen and Julie Jiang, “Update on 
Overseas Investments by China’s National Oil Companies.” International Energy Agency. 2014. 
3 Zhang, Zhongxiang. “China’s Energy Security, the Malacca Dilemma and Responses.” Energy Policy 29 
(12): 7612-7615. 2011. 
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reserves. Observing the United States’ shale gas revolution, the Chinese leadership hopes 
to similarly fuel switch from coal to cleaner natural gas.4 
As a result, China is implementing policies through its national contractual systems, 
fiscal regimes, and regulatory structures to promote domestic shale gas development. 
Although China’s leadership is successful in developing a stable, international petroleum 
industry within only a few decades, several of China’s policies towards its shale gas market 
discourage industry expansion or endanger the crucial relationship between the companies 
and the government.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Calow, Roger, Vanessa D’Alancon, Julian Doczi, Ilmi Granoff, Zhenbo and Sam Pickard. “Can Fracking 
Green China’s Growth.” Overseas Development Institute. 2015. 
 3 
CHINESE SHALE GAS RESERVES 
Shale reservoirs refers to petroleum trapped in fine-grained shale sedimentary rock 
formations. Unlike conventional reservoirs where petroleum can freely move through 
interconnected pore spaces, similar to a sponge, shale reservoirs have low permeability 
which limits the flow of petroleum to the well. To create additional permeability and extract 
resources out of the shale, a high pressure fluid containing sand or another gritty proppant 
is injected into the wellbore to create artificial fractures through which natural gas and oil 
will flow smoothly. Typically, resource abundance in a shale reservoir is low, however 
shale reserves are widespread and located throughout China, making this a valuable asset.5 
China possesses the largest shale gas reserves in the world with 1,115 trillion cubic 
feet (Tcf) of technically recoverable shale gas6 –nine times greater than China’s 
conventional gas reserves.7 Depicted in Figure 1, most of China’s shale gas is deposited in 
the Sichuan Basin (626 Tcf), with additional reserves located in the Tarim (216 Tcf), 
Junggar (36 Tcf), Songliao (16 Tcf) basins. Most of China’s shale projects are located in 
the Sichuan Basin, not only because of its vast shale gas reserves, but also because of access 
to water which is consumed during hydraulic fracturing.8 However, Yanchang Petroleum 
is now investing in the drier Ordos Basin.9 China’s shale gas reserves are in more 
                                                 
5 Chen, Weidong, Jiang Xi-men and Zhou Xiaolai. “China’s Shale Gas: Current Prospectives.” Nautilus 
Institute for Security and Sustainability. 2014. 
6 Technically recoverable reserves represents the volume of shale gas that can be produced with current 
technology, regardless of natural gas prices and production expenditures.  
7 Calow et al., op. cit. 
8 U.S. Environmental Information Agency. “Technically Recoverable Shale Oil and Shale Gas Resources: 
An Assessment of 137 Shale Formations in 41 Countries Outside the United States.” 2013. 
9 Feng, op. cit. 
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complicated formations than their U.S. counterparts. Reserves in the Sichuan Basin are as 
deep as 4500 meters, compared to the Marcellus (2134 meters) and the Eagle Ford (3505 
meters) formations.10 Deeper formation depth not only increases the exploration 
difficulties but also heightens extraction costs. In China it costs roughly 20,000 RMB/meter 
to drill a vertical well.11 Sichuan’s reserves are also only 33 to 52 meters thick, half as thick 
as their U.S. equivalent, making it more difficult for producers to drill horizontally into the 
formation. Furthermore, Sichuan’s shale formations have low porosity, thus requiring 
greater quantities of fracking fluid to stimulate production, and exhibit geological folding 
which complicates well productivity.12  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 U.S. Trade and Development Agency. “China Shale Gas Development and Technologies Reverse Trade 
Mission.” November 24, 2014. 
11 Chen et al., op. cit. 
12 U.S. Trade and Development Agency 2014, op. cit. 
 5 
Figure 1: Shale Gas Basins and Pipeline Infrastructure in China13 
 
China’s leadership sets high targets for its shale gas production. In the 12th Five-
Year Plan (FYP), China planned to double natural gas in primary energy consumption from 
4 percent in 2013 to 8.3 percent by 2015. Specifically, shale gas production targets are set 
at 6.5 billion cubic meters (bcm) of production per year, 990 horizontal wells drilled by 
2015, and 60-100 bcm of production per year by 2020.14 In 2014, however, China’s 2020 
targets were curtailed to 30 bcm per year. Of the 30 bcm producer per year, 25 bcm will 
                                                 
13 Advanced Resources International. “World Shale Gas Resources: An Initial Assessment.” 2011. 
14 Forbes, Sarah. “The United States and China: Moving toward Responsible Shale Gas Development.” 
Brookings Institution. 2013. 
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come from the Sichuan Basin alone.15 Furthermore, as of December 2015 China’s annual 
production is 5.1 bcm/year, failing to meet 6.5 bcm/year target.16  
The 13th FYP (2016-2020) also cites shale gas development as a strategic goal and 
indicates government support for 58 shale gas projects, naming Sichuan Changning, 
Chongqing Fuling, Yunan Zhaotong, Shaanxi Yanan, and Guizhou Zunyi as major 
development sites.17 The government has yet to update its production quantity goals - 
however, industry experts expect a 50 bcm/year target for the 13th FYP, which indicates 
renewed yet limited optimism in the shale gas industry.18 Although the reduction in China’s 
2020 shale gas targets from 100 bcm/year cites technical and economic obstacles, China’s 
shale contracts and regulations are also root causes. 
CURRENT SINO-FOREIGN JOINT VENTURES 
 
Although foreign companies are not allowed to independently explore, develop, or 
produce petroleum products in China, their involvement in NOC joint ventures is actively 
encouraged. In October 2007, Newfield Exploration and PetroChina entered into China’s 
                                                 
15 Calow et al., op. cit. 
16 Sung, Manchu. “Sinopec Plans to Boost Giant Shale Gas Projects, as China Set to Miss 2015 Shale 
Targets.” Oil Pro. 2016. http.//oilpro.com/post/21170/Sinopec-hopes-to-double-annual-production-
capacity-2017-giant-sha.  
17 National Development and Reform Commission. “Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui 
fazhan di shisan ge wunian guiji gangyao 中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十三个五年规划纲要 
[Outline of the 13th Five Year Plan on the Economic and Social Development of the People’s Republic of 
China]”. March 2016. http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/gzdt/201603/P020160318576353824805.pdf. 
18 Lu, Donghou. “Feichanggui de ‘shisanwu’ jiyu 非常规的‘十三五’机遇 [The 13th Five Year Plan’s 
Opportunity for Unconventionals]”. March 30, 2016. http://www.agoil.cn/zhuanti/gas-shales/2016-03-
30/9243.html.  
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first NOC shale gas joint venture project in Sichuan Province’s Weiyuan Field.19 As seen 
in Table 1, several International Oil Companies (IOCs) are now working alongside Chinese 
NOCs in shale gas exploration, development, and production. However, the recent decline 
in international petroleum prices has limited IOC investment in Chinese shale gas. Due to 
low prices and high costs, Hess has exited completely from China’s upstream industry.20 
Similarly, Shell has indicated it will no longer pursue the development of the Fushun-
Yongchuan shale gas block in Sichuan.21 However, BP signed its first PSA with CNPC in 
April 2016, building upon the framework agreement on strategic cooperation signed last 
October during President Xi Jinping’s visit to the U.K. Under the framework agreement, 
in the future BP can extend its China joint ventures to not only other shale gas projects, but 
also to fuel retailing, oil exploration, LNG trading, and carbon emissions trading. 22 
Significantly, unlike previous agreements between IOCs and Chinese NOCs, under this 
PSA CNPC will act as the operator while BP only contributes technical expertise and 
financial capital. 23 CNPC’s designation as operator indicates a growing recognition of the 
NOCs’ abilities as shale gas producers. 
 
                                                 
19 Lou, Ying and Wang Ying. “PetroChina Longgang May Be Nation’s Largest Gas Field.” 2008. 
Bloomberg. http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive &sid=af3t9d7hr7t8.  
20 Xu, Yihe. “Hess Quits all E&P Activities in China.” Upstream. December 18, 2015. 
http://www.upstreamonline.com/live/1419657/hess-quits-all-eandp-activities-in-china. 
21 Khawar, Muhammad Ali. “Royal Dutch Shell Limiting Investment in Chinese Shale Gas.” Bidness Etc. 
April 3, 2016. http://www.bidnessetc.com/66543-royal-dutch-shell-limiting-investment-chinese-shale-gas/. 
22 Eurasia Review. “BP and CNPC Sign Shale Gas Production Sharing Contract in China.” April 5, 2016. 
http://www.eurasiareview.com/05042016-bp-and-cnpc-sign-shale-gas-production-sharing-contract-in-
china/. 
23 Guo, Aibing. “BP Taking a Bet on China’s Shale Gas While Shell Backs Out.” Bloomberg. April 1, 
2016. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-01/bp-taking-a-bet-on-china-s-shale-gas-while-
shell-backs-out. 
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Table 1: IOC Shale Gas Projects in China to Date24 
Entrance 
Time 
IOCs NOCs Location Work 
Commitment and 
Status 
Oct 2007 Newfield 
Exploration 
PetroChina Weiyuan Field 
(Sichuan Province) 
Completed in 
2008 
Nov 
2009 
Shell CNPC Fushun-Yongchuan 
Block (Sichuan 
Province and 
Chongqing 
Municipality) 
Started joint 
production in Mar 
2012 
Jan 2010 BP Sinopec Kaili Block (Guizhou 
Province); 
Huangqiao Block 
(Jiangsu Province) 
Ongoing 
Mar 
2010 
Shell CNPC Jinqui Block 
(Sichuan Province) 
30-year PSA on 
tight gas 
Jul 2010 Hess Corp. Sinopec Shengli Oil Field 
(Shandong Province) 
Hess has exited 
China upstream. 
Mar 
2011 
Total CNPC Sulige South, (Inner 
Mongolia) 
Began production 
in May 2012 
Apr 2011 Chevron Sinopec Qiannan Basin 
(Guizhou Province) 
Seismic; two 
exploratory wells, 
both were 
unsuccessful. 
Jul 2011 ExxonMobil Sinopec Wuzhishan-Meigu 
Block (Sichuan 
Province)  
Ongoing 
Mar 
2012 
Total Sinopec Anhui Province No details 
Jun 2012 Shell Sinopec Hunan, Hubei, and 
Jiangxi Provinces 
Seismic and 2-3 
wells 
24 Hove, Anders, Junda Lin, David Sandalow, Jingchao Wu and Qing Yang. “Guanyu shixian zhongguo 
yeyanqi mubiao de jianyi 关于实现中国页岩气目标的建议[Meeting China’s Shale Gas Goals].” 
Columbia School of International and Public Affairs. 2014; Chou, Ella. “Shale Gas in China-Development 
and Challenges.” 2013; EIC Monthly. “Shell Expands Presence in China’s Shale Gas.” Page 21. 2013; and 
Eurasia Review, op. cit. 
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Dec 
2012 
ConocoPhillips Sinopec Qijiang (Chongqing 
Municipality) 
Seismic and two 
wells 
Dec 
2012 
Baker Hughes Honghua 
Group 
Research center in 
Chengdu, Sichuan 
Province 
Research on shale 
gas exploration, 
development and 
production. 
Ongoing 
Dec 
2012 
ConocoPhillips CNPC Neijing-Dazu, 
(Sichuan Province 
and Chongqing 
Municipality) 
Joint Study 
Agreement, 
abandoned in 
2014. 
Mar 
2013 
Eni CNPC Rongchang Block 
(Sichuan Province 
and Chongqing 
Municipality) 
Joint Study 
Agreement, 
Ongoing 
July 
2013 
Hess Corp. CNPC Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Region 
Hess has exited 
China upstream. 
Sep 2013 Shell Hunan 
Huasheng 
Energy 
Resources 
and Valin 
Iron & Steel 
Longshang Block 
(Hunan Province) 
No Details 
Apr 2016 BP CNPC Neijiang-Dazu Block 
(Sichuan Province 
and Chongqing 
Municipality) 
PSA signed with 
CNPC as 
operator. 
Shale gas development typically requires large amounts of sunk investments in 
drilling and hydraulic fracturing. In the United States, shale gas innovation was driven by 
Mitchell Energy, a large and diversified gas producer. As drilling technologies and 
practices were proven cost-effective, smaller firms then entered the market and scaled up 
Table 1 (continued)
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production.25 As seen in table 6, most shale gas IOC-NOC joint ventures are operated by 
China’s giants CNPC and Sinopec. With the backing of these two large firms, these 
projects have the financial and technical capacity to make such investments. Additionally, 
Chinese NOCs are increasingly offering stakes in domestic shale projects to IOCs in return 
for NOC participation in foreign unconventional oil and gas, liquefied natural gas, or deep-
water projects. This mutually beneficial cooperation attracts companies to China and 
globalizes China’s NOCs. For example, in 2013 CNPC concluded a deal with Italy’s Eni 
and became the first Chinese NOC to enter one of Mozambique’s offshore Rovuma gas 
field. Eni planned to reduce its funding commitment to the project and find a potential 
customer for its East African LNG exports. As for CNPC’s incentives, Eni signed a co-
operation agreement for shale gas exploration in Sichuan province’s Rongchang block. 
This form of asset swap is now an unspoken rule for IOCs to operate in China.26 Small, 
domestic Chinese firms are involved in the shale gas market, but lack the connections and 
experience to engage in asset swapping. Furthermore, as explained below, they are 
significantly constrained by the legal contracting process.  
 
 
                                                 
25 Krupnick, Alan, Xiaoli Liu, Lei Tian and Zhongmin Wang. “Stimulating Shale Gas Development in 
China.” Resources for the Future. 2014. 
26 Ding and Jiang, op. cit. 
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THE PETROLEUM SHARING AGREEMENT 
China’s shale gas contract utilizes the same structure and obligations as its 
conventional oil and gas contract. It is a hybrid agreement that incorporates aspects of a 
concession/royalty agreement into a production sharing agreement (PSA). Individual cases 
might also include joint venture agreement clauses if the Chinese oil company is working 
alongside a foreign NOC or IOC. In order to protect state assets, foreign participants are 
legally restricted to a minority partnership in any Chinese NOC upstream joint venture, but 
may act as the project operator.27 Within a joint venture, each investor’s share of operating 
expenses and revenues -their respective working interest and net revenue interest- are then 
determined before signing the contract.28 
Shale blocks are distributed by the Ministry of Land and Resources through auction 
bidding, where minimum exploration work, minimum expenditures, and the production 
sharing terms are the major bidding variables. Upon acceptance of the contract, the 
petroleum company then offers an up-front payment (signature bonus) to the Ministry of 
Land and Resources.29 The use of a signature bonus is common in several countries and 
motivates the company to begin production earlier to generate a return on their 
investment.30  The signature bonus also immediately provides revenues to the government 
agency, while the revenues from a reserve-based or production-based bonus are long-term 
and negatively impacted by inflation. The signature bonus, unlike a reserve-based bonus, 
27 Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China. “Waishang touzi chanye zhidao mulu 外商投
资产业指导目录 [Guiding Catalogue for Foreign Investment Industries].” 2002. 
http://wzs.mofcom.gov.cn/article/n/200208/20020800035372.shtml. 
28 Inkpen, Andrew and Michael Moffett. The Global Oil & Gas Industry, 214-253. Tulsa, Okla: PennWell. 
2011. 
29 AUPEC Ltd. “Evaluation of the Petroleum Tax and Licensing Regime of New Zealand.” 2009. 
30 Inkpen and Moffett, op. cit. 
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disadvantages smaller shale gas companies because they are less capable of financing the 
up-front payment. 
ROYALTIES AND RESOURCE TAX 
The first portion of a Chinese shale gas contract is the concession/royalty agreement 
if the contract was signed before 1 November 2011. Because the Chinese government owns 
the rights to all mineral resources, the government permits the company to produce and sell 
the shale gas in exchange for a royalty payment. The gas royalty is essentially a production 
tax. The royalty is paid in-kind with the natural gas produced at rates published by the 
Ministry of Finance. The rates are set at different levels subject to the location of the 
project. Table 2 demonstrates that Chinese offshore projects and on-shore operations in 
Qinghai, Tibet, and Xinjiang (locations with higher costs and less access to infrastructure) 
are subject to lower royalty rates when the project is small.31 
Table 2: Sino-Foreign Gas Royalties in Qinghai, Tibet, Xinjiang and Offshore32 
Annual Gross Output of Natural Gas 
(Cubic Meters) 
Royalty Rate 
Portion not exceeding 2 billion 0% 
Portion between 2 billion and 3.5 billion 1% 
Portion between 3.5 billion and 5 billion 2% 
Portion exceeding 5 billion 3% 
 
                                                 
31 Ernst & Young. “EY Oil and Gas Tax Guide.” 2015. http://www.ey.com /Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-
2015-Global-oil-and-gas-tax-guide/$FILE/EY-2015-Global-oil-and-gas-tax-guide.pdf. 
32 Ibid. 
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Shale gas operations in any other Chinese province are subject to a different set of 
royalties as detailed in Table 3. These projects are subject to higher rates when production 
remains under 2 billion cubic meters of natural gas a year. 
Table 3: Sino-Foreign Onshore Gas Royalties (All Other Provinces)33 
Annual Gross Output of Natural Gas 
(Cubic Meters) 
Royalty Rate 
Portion not exceeding 1 billion 0% 
Portion between 1 billion and 2.5 billion 1% 
Portion between 2.5 billion and 5 billion 2% 
Portion exceeding 5 billion 3% 
 
On contracts signed before 1 November 2011, China applies a sliding scale 
royalty.34 Typically, a higher, locked-in royalty will prevent further development and 
efficient production from the project because higher costs from royalty rates will reduce 
the field’s economic life. However, China’s sliding scale royalty implements a higher 
royalty rate when the production of the field is high, and a lower royalty rate when 
production declines. Thus, when production falls, the company has more capital available 
to exploit the field or for exploration and development elsewhere in the region, while the 
government also benefits from a longer term of fiscal revenues. 
After the State Council enacted the New Sino-Foreign Cooperative Exploration 
Regulations, petroleum agreements entered after 1 November 2011 do not include these 
                                                 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
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royalty regimes.35 However, no clarification has been made if the 1 November 2011 cut-
off date refers to the signing date or the effective date of the contract.36 Instead, shale gas 
companies are liable to pay a resource tax, which is a system similar to the previous royalty 
system. Under the new system, the average tax rate for natural gas is set at 6%, is based on 
the sales price rather than sales volume, and will eventually be raised to 10%.37 However, 
preferential tax rates are available for high sulfur gas extraction, tertiary recovery, and low 
abundance fields. These tax reductions emulate the attractive qualities of the scale 
royalty.38 For example, when recoverable reserves fall, (to 250 million cubic meters per 
square kilometer for the gas field) a 20% tax exemption is then enacted.39  
The new tax rules will also require part of the tax revenues be redirected to local 
governments. Within local coffers, these revenues then compensate locals for any 
environmental or social issues resulting from petroleum operations.40 By retaining 
petroleum revenues in the production region, both the shale gas company and the Chinese 
government acknowledge local interests and have the opportunity to augment their own 
public images. Nigeria’s Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta demonstrates 
                                                 
35 Ibid. 
36 Moser, Michael and Fu Yu. Doing Business in China. London: Juris Publishing. 2014. 
37 Ling, Song Yen and Irene Tang. “China to Raise Oil, Gas Upstream Resource Tax to 6% from 5% 
Starting Dec 1.” Platts. 2014. http://www.platts.com/latest-news/natural-gas/singapore/china-to-raise-oil-
gas-upstream-resource-tax-26901874. 
38 Ernst & Young, op. cit. 
39 Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China. “Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China 
and International Tax Guide.” 2011. http://tax.mofcom.gov.cn 
/tax/taxfront/en/article.jsp?c=30113&tn=1&id=3b031329 1b 9e4ec893e4824a61a1f9c6 
40 Hogan Lovells International LLP. “China Resource Tax Reforms to Roll out Nationwide.” 2011. 
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that diverting petroleum tax revenues to other regions or projects could instead fuel civil 
resentment towards the companies and government.41 
Furthermore, shale gas firms can also apply for royalty tax exemptions with the 
government. In the future, the government will issue similar tax exemptions for firms 
paying the resource tax.42 
PRODUCTION SHARING 
 
The second half of Chinese shale gas contract is the Production Sharing Agreement 
(PSA), which China has employed in its upstream petroleum industry since the 1980s.43 
The PSA separates the rights and obligations of each party during each phase: exploration, 
development, and production. It also delineates petroleum production into “cost oil” and 
“profit oil”, which in this case constitute shale gas. 44 In a PSA, the company is entitled to 
cost recovery through cost oil for current operating expenses, materials used in the year in 
which they are acquired, and for capital investment. In China, cost recovery is determined 
by the following expenses: 
 Petroleum royalties (or resource tax for PSAs signed after 1 November 
2011); 
 Production and operations; 
                                                 
41 Oyefusi, Aderoju. “Oil-dependence and Civil conflict in Nigeria.” University of Benin, Nigeria. 2007. 
42 Ernst & Young, op. cit. 
43 Hove et al., op. cit. 
44 Ibid. 
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 Exploration; 
 Development; and 
 9% deemed interest cost recovery on development costs.45  
Cost recovery generally ranges from 50% to 60% for onshore PSAs.46 The 
remainder oil, or profit oil, is then distributed between the company and the Chinese 
government based on the agreed percentage division. Therefore, China’s PSA places all 
financial risks on the petroleum company during the exploration and development phases, 
but assures cost recovery once the project is deemed commercial. However, because of 
geological obstacles and low international petroleum prices, only Sinopec’s Fuling project 
has achieved commercial production.47  
A PSA’s cost-recovery clause creates grey areas in which accountants might “gold 
plate” or inflate company expenditures to obtain a greater share of the gas produced at the 
expense of government take. Thus, China’s PSA contract structure might inherently add 
distrust in the IOC-government relationship, harming cooperation between the two 
parties.48 Since assuming power, President Xi Jinping has campaigned relentlessly against 
Zhou Yongkang’s network and corruption in the national oil industry, which could expose 
                                                 
45 Ernst & Young, op. cit. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Thomas, Mark. “Shale Fueled by Fuling on its Slow Boat to China.” E&P Magazine. January 12, 2016. 
http://www.epmag.com/shale-fueled-fuling-its-slow-boat-china-833821#p=full. 
48 Radon, Jenik. “The ABCs of Petroleum Contracts: License-Concession Agreements, Joint Ventures, and 
Production-Sharing Agreements.” 2005. 
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company gold-plating.49 Most at risk are non-joint venture shale projects. Within a joint 
venture, either between an IOC and Chinese petroleum company or solely among Chinese 
firms, partners need to approve project expenditures and are unlikely to sanction excessive 
spending. Non-joint venture projects lack this constraint. The newly deregulated shale gas 
industry could receive significant suspicion and investigation under the anti-corruption 
campaign, which could harm the company-government relationship. 
Furthermore, shale gas projects do not follow the same distinct phases (exploration, 
development, and production) associated with the conventional projects PSA. In shale gas 
projects, these three phases typically all go on simultaneously. Shale gas wells also deplete 
more quickly than conventional wells yet require a production period of around 30 years 
to become economic.50 As a result, shale gas firms have fewer incentives to invest in 
Chinese shale blocks.  
Another source of conflict is the PSA’s environmental standard provision. PSAs 
typically incorporate contractual provisions for environmental standards. Because a 
contractual provision is more easily contested than a regulatory statute, if the company 
violates the provision it will only be required to privately rectify the breach. In contrast, if 
the agreement was a pure concession agreement and not a PSA, this would be a violation 
of a legal statute and subject to legislatively approved sanctions, penalties, and public 
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condemnation.51 Thus, in some cases, the China’s PSA contractual structure might 
encourage environmental noncompliance. 
TAX DEDUCTIONS AND DEPLETION 
 
China does not operate a ring fence in its tax code. This allows a shale gas company 
to report its income tax on a consolidated basis for all PSA projects it owns in China. 
Therefore, companies can offset their losses in one project with gains in another, reducing 
their overall taxable incomes. Furthermore, China allows companies to carry forward net 
operating tax losses for five years to offset future taxable income.52 
China also provides several tax deductions to incentivize investment and lengthen 
production timeframes. For example, exploration expenditures incurred can be either 
expensed against income from other fields that the company owns in China or can be 
capitalized. Similarly, development expenditures may be depreciated on a straight-line 
basis, subject to a minimum period of eight years from which commercial production 
began. Development expenditures include the costs for design, construction, installation, 
drilling, and their corresponding research work. Furthermore, research and development 
expenditures may be deducted from taxable income at 150% of their actual expenses.53  
China, unlike the United States and France, does not employ a depletion allowance. 
A depletion allowance is a set tax break on operational expenditures in the exploration and 
production of non-renewable reserves, such as oil and gas. The untaxed revenues of the 
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reserve are then directed towards further development once the shale gas company is 
finished extracting from a previous field.54 Thus, a depletion allowance subsidizes the 
company’s operations providing the government benefits such as prolonged employment, 
steadier production, and more long-term fiscal revenues from royalties or corporate taxes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
54 Hennessee, Patrick, and Sean Hennessee. Oil and Gas Federal Income Taxation. CCH Publications. 
2016. 
 20 
SHALE GAS RIGHTS AND BIDDING 
Recently, China implemented two policies which originally were intended to 
stimulate shale gas development, but have instead produced unanticipated results.  
The first policy is the liberalization of shale gas bidding to several more actors. Many in 
China see the oligopoly structure of the oil and gas industry as counterintuitive for a shale 
gas revolution, which in the United States relied on competition and innovation. The MLR 
tendered a first round of shale gas block auctions in June 2011, inviting only six state-
owned enterprises to bid for four blocks. These six companies are CNPC, Sinopec, 
CNOOC, a provincial oil company, and two state-owned coal bed methane firms. In 
September 2012, the Ministry of Land and Resources held a second round of auctions for 
20 shale gas blocks, and made precedence by opening the auction to all domestic firms and 
international joint ventures. A total of 83 firms submitted bids and 16 firms won 19 out of 
the available 20 blocks.55 Two private firms (Huaying Shanxi Energy, a subsidiary of 
Wintime Energy, and Beijing Taitantongyuan Natural Gas) won exploration rights in two 
of the blocks, becoming the first private enterprises in the PRC to enter the upstream 
petroleum industry. The remaining 17 blocks went to central and local state-owned 
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enterprises.56 57 At first glance, the bidding policy was successful in diversifying the shale 
gas industry -none of the winning bidders in the second round were NOCs. Each auction 
winner earned the right to explore its block for three years and if it invests in exploration, 
it will also earn the right to develop the block. However, if it does not make the full work 
commitment, the company must relinquish a portion of the lease equivalent to the 
percentage of the work commitment not completed.58 
The second policy is the State Council’s 2011 classification of shale gas as a new 
type of mineral resource, separate from conventional gas. Because only NOCs have the 
right to produce conventional oil and gas resources, this decision now allows any company, 
including privately owned firms, to develop shale gas.59 
Although these two reforms represent China’s intent to liberalize the upstream oil 
and gas sector, smaller Chinese firms have had little success in shale gas development. 
First, it is acknowledged that most of the blocks auctioned off during the second bidding 
are remote and have worse subsurface geology and infrastructure than those distributed in 
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the first auction.60 Secondly, these blocks are areas not previously explored by the NOCs 
and had limited geological data. It is important to note that none of the auction winners in 
the second round have any experience in oil and gas exploration and development. Some 
of the bidders specialize in power generation or are energy investment firms, and some 
were established only months before the auction. With backgrounds in industries such as 
power and coal mining where revenue streams are ensured by the state and well known 
reserves, these companies might not fully incorporate risks prevalent in the shale gas 
industry, such as dry holes.61 These firms also lack access to China’s national shale gas 
R&D centers, which are operated by CNPC and Sinopec.62 
Secondly, conventional oil and gas resources are still legally monopolized by 
China’s NOCs. Because the contracts signed by the second round bidders include only 
shale gas rights and not the right to produce from any overlapping conventional oil or gas 
reservoirs, these firms are hindered in obtaining profits in the short-run. In the United 
States, firms like Mitchell Energy minimized any financial losses from risky shale gas 
operations because they operated in areas where shale formations overlapped conventional 
gas formations and they had the rights to both resources. These firms then had the option 
to produce from the shallower conventional formations to finance any setback in their 
deeper shale gas wells. Access to revenues from conventional reserves is all the more 
significant when the relative cost of a shale gas well is considered. Because of the folding 
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geography and road construction to transport machinery, the cost of drilling a shale gas 
well in the Sichuan Basin ranges from $11.3 to $12.9 million. In contrast, the average cost 
of a shale well in the Marcellus formation in the United States is around $7.6 million.63 In 
China, nearly 80 percent of the most prospective shale gas reserves overlap with 
conventional oil and gas reserves. However the exploration rights to any overlapping 
conventional fields are legally monopolized by the NOCs.64 
Overall, progress in the second round shale gas blocks has been slow. The first 
exploratory well was drilled on 5 December 2013, a year after the auction. By 2015, 400 
wells have been drilled and geological surveys conducted in the blocks awarding during 
these two auctions, yet Sinopec’s Fuling field remains the only big commercial find.65 
Because of the lack of commercial production from the second shale gas round, China’s 
has yet to hold a third auction round.66 
The relinquishment requirement in the shale gas contracts can also add risk to 
second round shale gas projects. Shale gas development is typically dispersed over large 
areas and relies on finding “sweet spots” in shale layers. The timeframe in which the 
commercial viability of a shale gas project can be determined is unpredictable. Thus, early 
relinquishments will not produce optimum results.67 
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Furthermore, data from well logs and other sources is crucial for the development 
of shale gas. Data in the United States plays an important role in directing producers with 
their limited capital towards the best opportunities. In China, access to data for shale gas 
operations is highly restricted by the NOCs. CNPC and Sinopec have no legal obligation 
to distribute their information from conventional onshore activities. In addition, oil and gas 
data have sometimes been protected by the government as state secrets.68  
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MIDSTREAM PIPELINE ACCESS 
Inadequate natural gas pipeline infrastructure as well as the lack of an open access 
policy are also hindrances to China’s shale gas development. Without mid-stream access, 
upstream shale gas producers are unable to sell their product. However, China does not 
need to build a vast pipeline system to meet its 2015 and 2020 shale gas targets. In the 
short-term, shale gas will likely be distributed through the current, regional pipeline 
systems. For example, shale gas from the Fuling field is already transported to coastal 
customers through Sinopec’s Sichuan-East Gas Transmission pipeline.69 Beyond 2020, 
China will require more sophisticated pipeline networks to transport its shale gas from 
production sites to urban markets.70  
In the United States, federal regulations exist that require open access, on a 
nondiscriminatory basis, to natural gas pipelines and storage facilities.71 Pipeline tariff rates 
are available to any customer through the state regulatory commission. Furthermore, 
vertical separation of the petroleum industry in the United States limits one firms control 
over production, transportation, and sales.72 However in China, 90% of the natural gas 
pipelines are owned and operated by CNPC alone.73 There have historically been no 
regulatory authority to mandate CNPC provide pipeline access or tariff quotes to other 
companies. Because of the mismatched bargaining power, Chinese unconventional gas 
producers (among others) have found it difficult to reach transportation agreements with 
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pipeline operators and pay a higher premium if the NOCs are willing to negotiate.74 
However, reforms are underway in China’s oil and gas pipeline management. In February 
2014, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) issued a new policy 
requiring operators of natural gas pipelines to provide unused capacity to new customers 
on a fair and nondiscriminatory basis. This policy is a signal with respect to breaking 
CNPC’s pipeline monopoly. However, this is a limited open access policy in comparison 
to that in the United States. In the short-term, new shale gas producers only have open 
access to excess capacity not being used by existing customers and pipeline operators.75 
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DOWNSTREAM PRICE REGULATIONS 
Natural gas prices in China have historically been regulated throughout the value 
chain. Natural gas wellhead prices, pipeline tariffs, and end-user prices are all regulated by 
the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC).  
 Wellhead prices include a profit margin and are based on upstream production 
costs. Suppliers and buyers are free to negotiate increases of up to 10%. 
 Pipeline tariffs are set based on three factors: cost, distance from the gas field 
to the city gate, and a profit margin set with an internal rate of return of 12%. 
 End-user prices are set by the gas source and usage. For example residential, 
commercial, industry, or fertilizer use.76 
Under these previous regulations, the government often sets the price of 
conventional natural gas and tight gas at levels below the equilibrium market price, 
resulting in shortages, low revenues, and a lack of innovation among gas suppliers.77 In 
July 2013, the National Development and Reform Commission announced reforms toward 
market pricing. Prices for “new gas” (gas above 2012 consumption levels) for non-
residential users are now linked to prices for fuel oil and liquefied petroleum gas. 
Additionally, in August 2014 the National Development and Reform Commission 
announced that the price of non-residential “old gas” will be increased by 0.4 RMB/cubic 
meter. Wellhead prices for shale gas has also been deregulated. Although city-gate gas 
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prices may still be subject to a price cap, shale gas producers now have an opportunity to 
obtain market-based profits from their business.78  
Shale gas projects also benefit from Ministry of Finance (MOF) subsidies. Effective 
from 2013 to 2015, shale gas receives a 0.4 yuan per cubic meter ($2.30/MMBtu) subsidy, 
representing 21% of the average city gate price for natural gas in China. Most of the shale 
gas projects auctioned off are eligible for this subsidy.79 Local governments can also 
subsidize shale gas production. China’s national shale gas subsides were extended to 2018, 
but will be to 0.2 yuan per cubic meter from 2019 to 2020, as development costs fall.80  
Since 2013, Chinese NOCs have reduced the cost to drill in the Sichuan Basin by 
23%81 through technologies and innovations such as Cluster Well Design and “Well 
Factory” production management.82 Nevertheless, prices in China’s shale gas market do 
not match competitive prices from alternatives. Even with subsidies, Fuling shale gas costs 
twice as much as LNG imports with average prices of $11.20/MMBtu83 and $6.70/MMBtu 
respectively.84 Furthermore, Fuling’s costs are higher than the actual tariffs Sinopec 
receives for its shale gas. Only with a production of 6 billion cubic feet/day could Fuling 
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shale gas be economic with current tariffs and subsidies.85 However, through their 
integrated supply chains, Chinese NOCs can finance these costly projects and benefit from 
long-term cost declines. Furthermore, despite cuts to capital budgets, CNPC and Sinopec 
are redirecting investment away from oil exploration and into upstream gas, including 
Sichuan’s shale projects.86  
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MULTIPLE REGULATORS 
Shale gas operators must coordinate several aspects of their operations with a 
complex matrix of Chinese regulators. The National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC) shapes overall policy and decides natural gas prices. The National 
Energy Administration (NEA) sets shale gas production targets. The Ministry of Land and 
Resources (MLR) conducts bid rounds. The Ministry of Finance (MOF) determines shale 
gas production subsidies. The Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) funds shale 
gas technology research and development. The Ministry of Environmental Protection 
(MEP) sets rules to protect air and water quality.87 The Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) 
previously was the authority for reviewing and approving foreign PSAs, however the 2013 
State Council Decree No. 638 legislated that PSAs need only be filed with the ministry’s 
local counterparts.88 
The existence of such a large bureaucratic network with overlapping jurisdictions 
creates coordination issues in shale gas policy. For example, both the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection and Ministry of Land Resources produce groundwater protection 
policy and if interagency communication is unclear, the shale gas developer does not know 
which policy to follow. Investment in shale gas proceeds more slowly than in a simpler 
bureaucracy because companies that are approved by one ministry might remain unsure if 
they require approval from another.89 Furthermore, the resource base and enforcement 
capacity of each agency varies, giving some agencies greater weight in shale gas policy 
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than their official authority.90 Although collaboration on policy issues among the ministries 
have improved recently, these are important challenges for foreign IOCs, some of which 
report a lack of clarity concerning the roles of Ministry of Environmental Protection, 
National Energy Administration, and National Development and Reform Commission.91 
Similarly, the release of new policies and regulations in China is often opaque, while giving 
IOCs inadequate input to the process or time to prepare for chances.92 
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ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES 
Shale gas producers must also maintain high standards in environmental protection 
and overcome public opposition from a growing environmental awareness. As a result of 
China’s environmental degradation from rapid industrialization, the environment is 
becoming a significant topic in Chinese public dialogue.93 In 2011, as a response to protests 
against a petrochemical project in Ningbo, cabinet members passed a requirement that any 
onshore or offshore project must now pass both a “social risk” test in addition to an 
environmental impact statement.94  
At the same time, China’s growing water stress is drawing criticism to water-
intensive industries, such as shale gas.95 Shale gas energy production can add to water 
stress not only through hydraulic fracturing, but also through the steam turbine in the 
natural gas power plant. However, as seen in Figure 2, water consumption in coal power 
generation is significantly higher than that in shale gas generation, due to greater water 
usage in flue gas scrubbing and power plant cooling. As a result, fuel switching from coal 
to shale gas in energy production could reduce China’s overall water demand.96  
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Figure 2: Water Consumption of 1 kWh Coal- and Shale Gas-fired Electricity in China97 
Furthermore, because a majority of China’s current shale projects are in the water-
rich Sichuan Basin, water-stress will not become a significant issue within the industry 
until development begins in drier regions such as Xinjiang or the Northeast.98 
Shale gas production also recovers significant quantities of fracturing fluid flow back and 
produced formation water which must be treated and safely disposed. China’s current 
regulations do not permit Class II injection wells, through which operators can reinject 
brines for long-term storage.99   Instead, operators must expensively truck brine to off-site 
97 Ibid. 
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evaporation ponds for water disposal, raising government concerns for contamination of 
local farmlands.100  
China also lacks seismic regulations for shale gas projects. Especially in the 
Sichuan Basin, which is already seismically active, hydraulic fracturing poses a threat 
when conducted along a fault zone. For example, mild earthquakes can deform the well 
casing and cement, allowing contaminated fluids to migrate up into drinking water 
aquifers.101 
Furthermore, the climate and economic benefits of shale gas depend on methane 
leakage rates. Shale gas can escape into the atmosphere during exploration, venting, 
flaring, production, transmission, and storage. Once in the atmosphere, methane is 84 times 
more powerful a greenhouse gas than CO2 over a 20-year period. For example, the 2015 
SoCalGas storage facility leak cost the company 62 million cubic feet of methane each day 
and accounted for a quarter of California’s total greenhouse gas emissions.102 Therefore, if 
China hopes to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions through fuel switching from coal to 
shale gas, it must minimize methane leakage. However, methane leakage rates are 
relatively low in China. For example, in 2012 China’s methane leakage was only 6.4 MT 
CO2e and 0.1% of its greenhouse gas emissions, compared to the U.S. with 192 MT CO2e 
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and 3.4%.103 China’s methane leakage is also disproportionately small when relative 
production is factored in (China’s 2012 natural gas production was 109 TCF/year 
compared to the U.S.’s 300 TCF/year).104 This implies China’s low methane leakage could 
be due to the younger age of its natural gas infrastructure. Unlike the United States, 
however, China does not publish its methane leakage data regularly or separate it into 
stages of production which can discredit the country’s monitoring capabilities.105 
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INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
While Chinese NOCs privately engage IOCs and service companies, the Chinese and 
U.S. governments also promote technology exchange and knowledge transfer within the 
shale gas sector.  Tapping China’s domestic shale gas is particularly appealing to the U.S. 
because it promotes global greenhouse reduction efforts, energy security, and economic 
development.106 Established in 2009, the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue 
facilitates cooperation among shale gas industrial and government leaders through several 
programs: 
 U.S.-China Shale Gas Resource Initiative;107 
 Energy Cooperation Program (Shale Gas Working Group);108  
 U.S.-China Oil and Gas Industry Forum; and109 
 U.S.-China Climate Change Working Group.110 
For example, in 2014 the U.S. Trade and Development Agency (TDA), under the U.S.-
China Climate Change Working Group, hosted eight Chinese public sector representatives 
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from the Ministry of Land and Resources, Ministry of Environmental Protection, 
Chongqing Development and Reform Commission, Sichuan Province Resource 
Administration, National Energy Administration, and National Energy Shale Gas R&D 
Center. During the trade mission, the delegation toured Marcellus and Barnett shale 
operations and met with representatives from DOE, EPA, ExxonMobil, Newark Energy, 
Baker Hughes, the Texas Railroad Commission, and the Texas Commission on 
Environmental Quality as well as other parties. Overall, there is great interest among the 
Chinese delegation of promoting the role of small and medium size shale gas developers, 
market oriented gas pricing policies, rural and urban production, wastewater reinjection 
practices, and seismic regulations.111 A similar TDA workshop was held this March in 
Yibin, Sichuan and networked U.S. service and equipment suppliers with prospective 
buyers hand-picked by the National Energy Administration.112 For example, Harcros 
Chemicals marketed its energized fracking fluid technologies in development which 
through a CO2 or N2 foam, viscoelastic surfactant, and nanoparticles can significantly 
reduce the water resources needed to stimulate a formation.113 In order to ensure a 
downstream market for shale gas, the Yibin workshop also invited transport and electricity 
companies to participate. In May 2014, the U.S. Department of State and MLR also 
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organized their first regulatory and tendering/contracting workshop through the U.S.-China 
Climate Change Working Group.114 
Although these dialogues include a diversity of U.S. petroleum and service companies, 
China’s industry participation is dominated by the NOCs and disadvantages the newer, 
smaller shale gas firms. For instance, the Energy Cooperation Program’s Energy Financing 
and Investing Working Group and the China Industrial Overseas Development and 
Planning Association (CIODPA) will implement activities that provide Chinese and U.S. 
executives with decision-making tools to promote energy investment partnerships. 115 
However, of CIODPA’s member enterprises, only one is a winning bidder of the second 
shale gas bid (Shenhua Group). A majority of CIODPA’s member enterprises are large 
SOEs, including CNPC and Sinopec, which will benefit directly from the program’s 
investment arrangements.116 
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Track.” Embassy of the United States, Beijing. July 14, 2014. http://beijing.usembassy-
china.org.cn/2014/u.s.-china-strategic-and-economic-dialogue-outcomes-of-the-strategic-track.html. 
115 U.S. China Energy Cooperation Program, op. cit. 
116 China Overseas Development Association. “Member Enterprises.” CODA. 2015. 
http://coda.chinagoabroad.com/en/pages/list/hydw. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
China’s shale gas policy is successful in developing a nascent industry. Nevertheless, 
several features of the contractual, regulatory, and market systems so that when petroleum 
prices and investment activities rebound, China can efficiently produce its vast reserves. 
Therefore, the following initiatives are recommended: 
1. Remodel the Production Sharing Agreement: Chinese policy makers should 
produce a model PSA contract for shale gas projects. Shale gas projects do not 
follow the same distinct phases associated with conventional projects and their 
PSAs require production periods of around 30 years. A model shale gas PSA will 
also clarify the likely structure of the commercial deal and reduce the cost of 
contract negotiation. Because coal bed methane projects exhibit similar phases as 
shale gas projects, Chinese policy makers can retrofit provisions from China’s coal 
bed methane (CBM) PSA to develop a more efficient shale gas PSA. For example, 
the onshore CBM PSA does not contain relinquishment obligations and could give 
the shale gas firm sufficient time to develop commercially attractive flow-rates 
within the block. Furthermore, the CBM PSA includes a Pilot Project Stage, which 
allows the firm to evaluate potential returns from the shale gas block before 
committing to full-scale development. Finally, commerciality and cost recovery in 
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the PSA should be determined gradually in the course of exploitation and should 
be approved by sub-areas of the block, not the block as a whole. 117 
2. Implement a Depletion Allowance: A depletion allowance will promote China’s 
shale gas development, encouraging employment and generating more fiscal 
revenues over the long-run. Similar to France’s depletion code, China should 
require its depletion allowance to only be re-invested in Chinese territories to 
ensure depletion allowance funds finance domestic rather than foreign projects. 
Depletion allowances can be determined through cost depletion and the 
government can extend an additional percentage depletion option to 
independent shale gas firms. Thus, projects can more rapidly progress from the 
development phase to commercial production and be eligible for PSA cost 
recovery. 
3. Maintain Petroleum Tax Revenues within the Production Region: Government 
redistribution of petroleum tax revenues for local education, health, or 
environmental projects not only compensates local populations for costs 
associated with petroleum production, but also legitimizes the relationship 
between the government and the petroleum company. China’s resource tax is a 
step in this right direction. Chinese policy makers and companies should further 
engage the public with programs funded by the local petroleum operations. For 
                                                 
117 Hove et al., op. cit. 
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example, Shell China’s volunteers regularly hold safety education programs at 
Sichuanese schools118  and the company’s “New Economy China Project” helps 
finance local green industries.119 Similarly, Chinese NOCs are also becoming 
involved in the local community through welfare construction and public 
education.120 These projects present the company as not just as an economic 
partner but also as a social partner. 
4. Manage Environmental Impacts: Chinese shale gas companies and IOCs should 
continue promoting shale gas as a cleaner and less water intensive alternative to 
coal while minimizing any environmental hazards, such as methane leakage or 
water pollution. Methane leakage from shale gas production significantly reduces 
the greenhouse gas benefit of fuel switching from coal to gas. Thus, shale gas 
companies can use public relations to show a mutualistic relationship between 
themselves and environmental regulators by adopting mandatory Reduced 
Emission Completion (RECs) and annual public disclosure of methane emissions. 
Adequate maintenance and monitoring of natural gas infrastructure will minimize 
                                                 
118 Shell China. “Jinqiu xiangmu guanzhu ertong anquan changdao anquan wenhua zoujin xiaoyuan金秋项
目关注儿童安全 倡导安全文化走进校园 [The Autumn Project Pays Attention to Children Safety, 
Introducing a Safety Culture to Campus].” Shell. March 28, 2014.  
http://www.shell.com.cn/zh/environment-society/community/community-care/talks-to-community-kids-
for-road-safety-20140328.html. 
119 Shell China. “2014 Lvse chuangyehui – ji Qiaopai shehui touzi xiangmu ‘xinjingji zhongguo’ zouguo 
shinian 2014绿色创业汇--记壳牌社会投资项目“新经济中国”走过十年 [2014 Green Entrepreneurship 
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120 Sinopec, op. cit. 
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methane leakage in China’s younger infrastructure. Similarly, shale gas firms can 
minimize methane leakage during wellhead operations through technologies such 
as green completions, plunger lift systems, desiccant dehydrators, dry seal 
systems, and pneumatic controllers.121 Furthermore, seismic and water 
treatment regulations should be designed to complement a safe and economic 
shale gas industry. 
5. Build Regulatory Capacity and Reduce Regulatory Overlap: Improving 
coordination and regulatory capacity among ministries will promote 
environmental compliance and relieve petroleum investors of regulatory 
uncertainty. China should also publish a joint guide detailing all regulatory 
approvals required for shale gas investments. Similar guides have successfully 
summarized regulatory steps and responsibilities in the United States.122 
Furthermore, China should formulate environmental regulations on wastewater 
injection practices and seismic monitoring. 
6. Incorporate Second Round Shale Gas Firms in International Partnerships: 
Because second round block winners are new to the shale gas industry and have 
limited capital, there is a significant need for technology transfer from U.S. joint 
ventures and service providers. However, China’s participation in international 
shale gas technology and practices programs is monopolized by the NOCs. Giving 
                                                 
121 Harvey, Susan, Vignesh Gowrishankar, and Thomas Singer. “Leaking Profits.” NDRC. March 2012. 
122 Hove et al., op. cit. 
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second round producers a seat at international partnerships and research 
programs can gradually train them in upstream development, adding a 
competitive force to China’s shale gas industry.  
7. Relegate Shale Gas Development to either Oligopolistic NOCs or Decentralized 
Companies: China should either further deregulate its petroleum industry or rely 
on its NOCs for shale gas development. Policy makers should not spend resources 
on maintaining the status quo.  Chinese NOCs have experience in hydraulic 
fracturing and horizontal drilling, diversified operations, foreign joint venture 
support, and complete control over conventional reserves. This leaves China’s 
smaller shale gas firms at a disadvantage, unless policy makers drastically reform 
China’s petroleum industry. The shale gas revolution in the United States is 
attributed to several small, competitive firms that reduced costs through 
breakneck innovation. However, any Chinese shale gas revolution will start with 
CNPC or Sinopec unless the entire natural gas value chain is deregulated. 
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CHINA’S NOC SHALE GAS REVOLUTION 
Given current shale gas policies, it appear that China’s NOCs will be the source 
any shale gas innovation. Sinopec and CNPC have vast experience in developing tight gas, 
through which they have acquired advanced technologies in horizontal drilling and 
hydraulic fracturing that can be transferred to shale fields. Secondly, these two firms own 
the exploration rights to the most promising shale gas blocks in China. Thirdly, China’s 
NOCs have access to international industrial programs. They also have the financial 
capacity to invest in North American shale gas blocks and transfer production and 
managerial ability to their own projects in China. The NOCs control most of China’s oil 
service firms and natural gas pipelines, ensuring access to upstream equipment and 
downstream markets. They are also large enough to take on financial risks and can 
subsidize shale gas development with their conventional production. At the same time, 
NOCs have strong political capital, and can more effectively adopt industry regulations 
and conduct public relations with customers. Under these circumstances, China’s shale gas 
revolution will be a far different from North America’s, and will likely be spearheaded by 
Sinopec and CNPC. 
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Appendix: List of Interview Subjects by Date (Anonymized) 
1. Western oil company official, Houston, April 4, 2016 
2. Western oil company official, Houston, April, 4 2016 
3. Academic analyst, Houston, April 4, 2016 
4. Western oil company official (via telephone), Beijing, April 5, 2016 
5. Western oil company official (via telephone), Houston, April 6, 2016 
6. Western oil company official (via telephone), Oklahoma City, April 9, 2016 
7. Western oil company official (via telephone), Houston, April 11, 2016 
8. Government official (via telephone), Washington, DC, April 11, 2016 
9. Energy consultant (via telephone), Beijing, April 14, 2016 
10. Energy consultant (via telephone), Hong Kong, April 17, 2016 
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